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Abstract—It is important to be able to establish formal 
performance bounds for autonomous systems. However, formal 
verification techniques require a model of the environment in 
which the system operates; a challenge for autonomous systems, 
especially those expected to operate over longer timescales. This 
paper describes work in progress to automate the monitor and 
repair of ROS-based autonomous robot software written for an a-
priori partially known and possibly incorrect environment model. 
A taint analysis method is used to automatically extract the data-
flow sequence from input topic to publish topic, and instrument 
that code. A unique reinforcement learning approximation of 
MDP utility is calculated, an empirical and non-invasive 
characterization of the inherent objectives of the software 
designers. By comparing off-line (a-priori) utility with on-line 
(deployed system) utility, we show, using a small but real ROS 
example, that it’s possible to monitor a performance criterion and 
relate violations of the criterion to parts of the software. The 
software is then patched using automated software repair 
techniques and evaluated against the original off-line utility.  
Keywords— self-healing, autonomous system, performance 
guarantee, automated repair,  ROS, reinforcement learning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As robot systems are increasingly deployed in domestic, 
industrial and military applications, it is increasingly important 
to develop a method to establish bounds for how systems will 
perform under realistic operating conditions. While there is an 
established engineering tradition of using mathematics to 
model physical structures and processes sufficiently to 
guarantee that a construction will fulfill its specification, there 
are challenges applying this to autonomous systems [1]. Not 
many software developers have the skill set necessary to 
formally establish program correctness according to a 
specification. But even if they did, formal verification of 
software [2] [3] and autonomous systems [4], as well as ‘correct 
by construction’ formal synthesis methods [5] all suffer from 
the problem that they require a designer-specified model of the 
environment. And that model can be incomplete because of 
designer oversight or oversimplification of a complex and 
dynamic environment. For autonomous systems that are 
expected to operate over longer timescales, there is also the 
issue of encountering significant drift over time between the 
model and the environment encountered by the agent. 
Inspired by progress in empirical automated software repair 
[6] we propose an approach to the automatic analysis and repair 
of autonomous robot system software to handle environment 
model related performance failures. Leveraging static analysis 
techniques [7] used in compilers and security analysis, the 
approach does not require software engineers to do more than 
they are doing now in terms of coding. It aims to accomplish for 
autonomous systems, what approaches like SapFix [8], 
Clearview [9] and others [6] have achieved in automated 
software patching.  
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section II 
introduces the basic ideas in our approach. Section III uses a 
short example to illustrate our non-invasive approach to analysis 
and repair.  Section IV summarizes the direction of the work and 
the issues of scaling to future plans. 
II. TARL APPROACH 
The first assumption of our proposed approach is that while 
most autonomous robot software is not developed using formal 
verification techniques, nonetheless, software  engineering 
experience is such that the systems produced by experienced 
software developers are a solid first approximation to a system 
with formal performance guarantees. We will begin our 
approach to formal performance guarantees by leveraging the 
skills of software developers. This has the advantages of not 
asking the software development community to adopt new 
formalisms, and widening the scope of our method, at least in 
principal, to include any existing (ROS) robot software. 
Our second assumption is that experienced software 
professionals are capable of writing a performance monitor that 
will signal when their software is working as they intended it to 
work (i.e., to their apprehension of the specification). The field 
of runtime verification addresses this capability formally [10], 
but our need is for far less; an informal monitor would suffice.  
It is extremely common for the developers of autonomous 
robot software to test their algorithms using a simulation tool 
[11]. While is it true that simulation tools do not replace physical 
testing, especially for uncertain environments, they nonetheless 
have become very powerful and comprehensive – driven often 
by the needs of realistic gaming applications. It is very likely 
still true that “Simulation is doomed to succeed” [12] in the 
sense that simulations only model what the designer expects to 
happen (or v.v.). However, software designers’ use of 
simulation opens for us an approach to non-invasive and 
automatic formal characterization of working software, for at 
least the conditions that the simulation implements. And we will 
show that ultimately this will not be a restriction. 
A. Formal Model 
An autonomous robot system operating in a partially known 
environment will be modeled as an MDP M(S, A, P, R) where 
the state S is a function of sensor signals (we will augment this 
presently), the actions A are the actuator commands, the 
transition function P is the stochastic environment, and reward 
R is the feedback on whether the system is satisfying its 
performance specification. A policy  for M selects which 
action to carry out based on the state. We will consider the 
human-written system software to implicitly embody the policy 
for M, and the human-written performance monitor to 
implicitly embody the reward R.  
The utility U(s) sS for an MDP is a measure of the long-term 
desirability of each sS and can be written via a Bellman eq: 
U(si) = R(si)  +   j  P(sj  | si, (si)) U(sj)             (1) 
for discount  and deterministic policy . We propose that 
utility presents a non-invasive and automatic way to 
characterize the performance of autonomous system software, 
to indicate where the software may be lacking when the 
performance monitor fails, and to automatically repair the 
software. Reinforcement learning [13] gives us a way to 
calculate utility, but only if the software can be automatically 
instrumented for the calculation. 
B. ROS  
The ROS robot operating system is extremely widely used and 
has greatly improved the portability of robot code since its 
release in 2007. A ROS system is composed of computing 
nodes that communicate over named channels called topics. 
Sensor driver software publishes incoming measurements on 
sensor topics. Other computing nodes can register callback 
functions that will be triggered whenever data arrives on a 
topic. Actuator drivers, that control the mechanism, register 
callbacks that are triggered whenever data is written to actuator 
topics. We will restrict our attention to ROS software both 
because of its popularity and its convenient topic/node 
structure. A ROS computation graph shows computation nodes 
connected via the topics they communicate on. This makes it 
very clear where data flows are coming in and going out.  
C. Taint Analysis and Reinforcement Learning (TARL) 
The performance monitor R, written by the human software 
designers, tests all the input topics necessary to determine if the 
performance guarantee holds. It is necessary to find an 
automatic way to identify the connections, line by line through 
computing node source code, between input topics and actuator 
topic publishing commands. While some of this data flow is 
evident in the ROS computation graph, most of it is hidden 
within the source code. We will automatically find these data 
flows and instrument them so that the utility can be estimated 
in terms of sensor state and statement number. We will then 
show how this information can be used to detect when software 
is no longer performing correctly due to unanticipated aspects 
of the environment, and to potentially repair it. 
Taint analysis [7] is a static analysis technique employed in 
compiler optimization and security analysis. The analysis starts 
with a program and storage location to investigate for a 
potential attack, the sink. Any user input location is a taint 
source. The program is investigated to see what additional 
storage locations become tainted in storing any computations 
that involve a tainted location and whether this leads to the sink. 
The sequence of statements between source and sink is the taint 
list. We use PyT [14] (modified for ROS) to find taint lists in 
ROS/Python code and instrument them for utility learning. 
We use this as follows: Each taint list line is automatically 
instrumented with a hook function that calls a reinforcement 
learning (RL) algorithm. To calculate the utility (called value 
in RL) we ask the software designers to repeatedly run the 
software, once they consider it finished, using whatever 
simulation they have been using. Whatever tradeoffs the 
designers implicitly made in implementing the specification is 
made explicit in this utility and will be our tool for 
understanding the software and potentially repairing it. We 
employ a SARSA TD-RL [13] algorithm to estimate  utility in 
terms of sensor state, taint-list line number and a reward-scaled 
20 def callback(data): # collect position sensor 
21   global pos 
22   pos = data.pose.pose.position # from topic 
23 
24 def travel(goal,vout): # move to goal 
25   global pos 
26   err, delta, vel = 1, 0, 0 
27   while err>Epsilon: # stop within Epsilon 
28      delta = goal – pos  
29      err     = abs(delta) 
30      vel     = 5 * delta 
31      vout.publish(vel) # write to topic 
32       
33 if __name__ == ‘__main__’: 
34    try: 
35      rospy.init_node('Traveller', anonymous=True) 
36      rospy.Subscriber(Odometry,callback) 
37      vpub=rospy.Publisher(Velocity,Twist,10) 
38       while True: # go back and forth  
39         travel(G1,vpub) 
40         travel(G2,vpub) 
41    except rospy.ROSInterruptException: 
42       pass 
Taint List: 
(‘if __name__==’__main__’’, 33) 
(‘data=Odometry’, 36) 
(‘pos=data.pose.pose.position’,22) 
(‘while True’, 38) 
(‘delta=goal – pos’,27) 
(‘vel=5*delta’,30) 
(‘vout.publish(vel)’,31) 
Figure 1: ROS/Python program implementing a recurrent robot task 
(top); output of ROS-modified PyT taint analysis (bottom). 
flow value. This last unique addition to the SARSA rule makes 
utility sensitive not just to control-flow, but also to how the 
information is being manipulated at each line. 
III. EXAMPLE 
Figure 1(top) shows python code for a ROS node that shuttles 
a robot between two goal locations (e.g. delivery robot). The 
performance monitor (not shown) is that the robot reaches each 
goal within a time and precision bound.  The taint list (Fig. 
1(bottom)) tags the data flow in the program and is 
instrumented for RL estimation of utility as described. For 
convenience, the data below shows just the G1 to G2 transit. 
A. Offline Utility 
Let us consider that the robot has an odometry sensor and 
velocity output, and also a binary terrain type sensor. This latter 
is unused in Fig.1 as the designers consider the terrain won’t 
affect the performance. Fig. 2 shows the utility calculated by 
the SARSA algorithm converged for the performance 
specification (reward) for the ‘off-line’ case, i.e., before the 
software is deployed. The red points are the terrain sensor true 
case, and blue are the false case. Line number are the left axis 
and odometry the right. This graph is an empirical 
characterization of the software designers’ intent, subject to 
perhaps faulty information about the environment. 
 
Figure 2: Utility table run under expected environment conditions 
B. On-line Utility 
Now let us consider what happens when our autonomous robot 
system software is deployed, and it is found that the 
environment does not behave as expected. It is found that 
muddy terrain conditions are sometimes experienced in transit, 
which slows down the progress of the robot towards its G2 goal. 
Using the same RL framework, utility from real life missions is 
collected; some missions experience the terrain issues and 
(sometimes) fail and some experience the same environment 
the designers expected. In this paper, to simplify the time 
aspects of testing, we don’t run a physical robot mission. We 
run another version of the off-line simulation in which the 
environment model is changed.   
Fig. 3 shows the utility collected during missions which 
sometimes failed because of unexpected and unmodeled terrain 
conditions. The horizontal axis is odometry and the colors are 
as before. Looking at the difference of off-line and on-line 
utilities we can isolate a region of maximum utility difference, 
indicated in Fig 3 by the dashed rectangle. In that region we 
calculate the average utility curves for the taint list on-line and 
off-line cases and compare them 
 𝑞𝑠𝜋(𝑛) = ∑  𝑞𝜋(𝑚, 𝑝, 𝑛)
𝑚,𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
 
              (2) 
Where n is line number, m is terrain sensor, p is odometry and 
q is the utility.  
 
Figure 3: Utility table under unexpected environment conditions 
Figure 4(a) shows this comparison, which evidences a peak at 
the 2nd last line (vel=5*delta). As it shows the maximum change 
in utility, we propose this identifies it as the most likely culprit 
for the failure and, hence, the candidate for repair analysis. 
  
Figure 4: Comparison of off-line (blue) and on-line (yellow) utility 
slices qs with difference (red) (a) original, (b)  lines swapped. 
It is reasonable to ask if the peak simply precedes the line 
closest to the reward (the publish). To show that our addition of 
flow information to the SARSA rule addresses this, the same 
test was done but with Fig.1 lines 29 and 30 swapped. The result 
is shown in Fig. 4(b) which now has a peak at the 3rd last line, 
correctly reflecting the swap. The addition of the reward-scaled 
flow value to the SARSA update equation is what makes utility 
sensitive to the values being calculated. 
C. Automated Repair 
Automated program repair [6] is an area of increasing interest 
to automate and speed up the patching of commercial software 
bugs, especially security related bugs and for self-healing 
autonomous devices. The process is typically divided into two 
phases: determining where the bug might be located in the 
software and proposing/testing fixes to the bug. Our approach 
here will address the single line culprit model we developed in 
the prior section. However, there is nothing that would limit this 
being applied to a multiple line culprit model. We will also 
continue to use RL as a solution method – this time to search 
over the space of program modifications. Determining how to 
edit the code will be divided into two steps: 
1. Mutation of the affected code to generate potential 
software patches 
2. A modified -Greedy policy and SARSA TD-RL 
algorithm to determine which mutation produces 
optimal performance 
We use the Python AST library to determine any constants in 
the identified line and generate a set of mutated values for these 
constants [8]. Every copy of the mutated instruction is protected 
(i.e., within an IF statement) by the condition used to make the 
value table slices, Eq. (2). Rather than testing one mutation at a 
time, all mutations are tested by selecting among them with an 
-Greedy policy and monitoring average total reward (ATR) 
compared to that of the initial, off-line performance 
ATR = t Rt / E                                 (3) 
where E is the number of episodes and t Rt the total reward up 
to time t. Fig. 5 shows a graph of ATR for the off-line case 
(blue), the on-line case that encounters problems (yellow), the 
-Greedy search of mutations for repair (green), and the final 
selected repair (red). The ATR performance of the -Greedy 
search, while it is better than the on-line performance, is not as 
good as the original off-line performance. The reason is that the 
-Greedy modification conducts significant search exploration 
of the mutated code, picking up a lot of performance hits. The 
curve is slowly rising and looks as if it will approach the offline 
value eventually. However, once we estimate the optimal 
mutation, we can simply re-estimate the utility using only that 
optimal mutation. That is the function shown in red on the 
graph, re-establishing the performance guarantee. 
 
Figure 5: Code mutation and evaluation for the running 
example 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
While it is becoming evident that its necessary to establish 
performance guarantees for autonomous systems, this is very 
challenging in practice. Software designers rarely have the 
mathematical skills to use significant formal verification. And 
even if they did, uncertainty about the environment encountered 
in execution (their specification for verification) would weaken 
this approach this in any case. We are inspired by the extremely 
practical work done in automated software repair [8] to propose 
an automated analysis and repair approach for existing software 
for autonomous robot systems.  
This paper describes work in progress, and the results presented 
are from a thorough but small feasibility study. Our next steps 
are to apply this to a large quadrotor mission in ROS-M. Issues 
of scale need to be addressed in a mission with a multipart 
performance guarantee resulting in multiple taint lists of 
varying lengths being identified. By calculating one utility per 
taint list and using the full multi-part performance monitor as 
reward for every list, we propose to avoid the potential 
exponential increase in utility size (2num_lists) while allowing for 
performance related cross-effects between taint flows. The 
example here uses a tabular utility. We expect however to need 
topic-specific, parametric forms in future work. 
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